Myanmar has almost 200 large dams and an estimated hydropower potential of 39,000 MW, with economical exploitable potential of about 37,000 MW. Installed hydropower capacity rose from 253 MW in 1990 to 745 MW by 2002. Total installed capacity in 2010 was at least 2,449 MW, described as 6% of potential. In 2002, Myanmar generated 6,614 GWh of electricity, split across oil at 612 GWh (9%), gas at 3,770 GWh (57%), and hydropower at 2,232 GWh (34%). These figures frame how the Myanmar hydropower market sits alongside gas and oil in the national mix while remaining far below what is technically possible.
Many planned hydropower plants have been designed mainly for export, which shapes project economics, transmission priorities, and controversy. Myanmar’s plans include five-year short-term plans and a 30-year strategic plan that covers domestic supply and exports to neighboring countries, especially China, Thailand, and India. Total planned hydropower development is listed at 14,600 MW. The project queue is not only a few mega-dams: beyond the twelve large planned projects above 1,000 MW, there are at least another twelve in the 100–1,000 MW range and at least 27 microhydro projects below 100 MW. This split matters because it signals both grid-scale ambitions and smaller local builds.
Chinese Capital, Joint Ventures, and the Project Reality Check
Chinese participation is extensive. At least 45 Chinese multinational corporations have been involved in approximately 63 hydropower projects in Myanmar, including substation and transmission line projects. The Myitsone Dam shows the typical structure and the political risk: it was planned as a 6,000 MW project built by the Upstream Ayeyawady Confluence Basin Hydropower Company, a joint venture of China Power Investment Corporation (CPI), Myanmar’s Ministry of Electric Power, and Asia World Company. The project has been suspended since a 30 September 2011 announcement by President Thein Sein, and as of 2017 it remained suspended, while China has been lobbying for revival. Plans also tied Myitsone’s output primarily to export to Yunnan, China, while CPI contended Myanmar would have first claim and only surplus would be exported.
Export orientation is also visible on the Salween River, where seven dams have been proposed. The largest is the Tasang Dam, cited at 7,100 MW in one source and as 7,110 MW in another, highlighting how public figures can vary by reference. A groundbreaking ceremony for Tasang was held in March 2007, and China Gezhouba Group Co. (CGGC) started preliminary construction shortly after. Separately, Myanmar energy reporting describes Tasang’s plan to supply 1,500 MW to Thailand, and describes Myitsone as expected to supply 100% of its electricity to China. In Mekong Basin discussions, years of political instability are described as generally impeding hydropower development in Myanmar’s basin areas, underscoring that financing and engineering are only part of delivery.
Chinese investment influence extends beyond individual dams into the broader investment story. An economy profile states that Chinese FDI increased from USD 775 million in 2007 to USD 21.867 billion between 2007 and 2015, accounting for 40% of all FDI in the country, with much of it going into energy and mining industries. These capital flows sit in a wider Southeast Asian context where hydropower capacity is expected to grow from 61.20 GW in 2025 to 64.07 GW in 2026, reaching 80.58 GW by 2031 at a 4.68% CAGR over 2026–2031. Myanmar-specific project decisions, including export allocations and suspension risks, will play out against this regional push toward new capacity and evolving grid needs.
What is Myanmar’s estimated hydropower potential and current scale of installed capacity?
How many Chinese companies are involved in Myanmar hydropower projects?
What happened to the Myitsone Dam project and what capacity was planned?
How do export plans shape the Myanmar hydropower market?
